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Low access to formal credit persists in most of developing economies also in 
Indonesia. Most of households especially in rural areas do not familiar with formal 
credit. Therefore, formal credit institution needs a mediation or substitution.  Recent 
studies argue that social capital could to a better flow of information between 
creditors and borrowers and hence less adverse selection and moral hazard in the 
market for credit. The guarantee of groups and pressure by social network also are 
important techniques to improve credit performance.  The relation between social 
capital and credit access is an interesting issue since the promotion of formal credit 
facilities in rural areas is argued as an important policy in reducing poverty level.   
The aim of this paper is to describe the connection between social capital and access 
to formal credit, especially from commercial banking in the case of a Javanese 
village. To describe the connection, this paper will seek what are the different 
characteristics between household that having access to commercial credit and the 
other group of households. However, since there is also an argument that social 
capital does not guarantee poor people to access formal credit, this paper also 
analyse other important variable namely ‘social position’ of the head of household in 
their rural community.   
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Poor households in rural areas do not familiar with formal credit, which deliver funds 
through formal financial institutions, such as commercial banks. Formal credit 
institution needs a mediation or substitution. Narayan and Prittchet (1997) argue that 
social capital could to a better flow of information between creditors and borrowers 
and hence less adverse selection and moral hazard in the market for credit. The 
guarantee of groups and pressure by social network credit are important techniques to 
improve credit performance (see: Rhyne and Otero 1994).  
 
In the case of Tanzania, Narayan and Prittchett (1997) found that a larger fraction of 
households in villages with higher social capital report using credit for agricultural 
improvements.  In the case of Indonesia, Grootaert (1999) concludes that households 
with higher social capital are better able to obtain credit. He found that members of 
financial associations more likely to obtain credit than non-members and the obtained 
credit amounts were much larger.   
 
All local associations whatever its prime objectives are important to increase the 
access to credit (Grootaert, 1999). As argued by Van  Bastelaer (2000), the social 
networks are important elements of most type of formal or informal programs that 
provide credit access to the poor. However, according to Tonkiss (2000),  the forms 
of social capital are not simply or necessarily conductive to economic development, 
in two respects. The first has to do with inequality, the second with questions of 
capacity.  
 
Where resources of social capital are unevenly distributed, social networks can be a 
basis for corruption, cronyism, or other forms of rent-seeking behavior. In village 
level, as suggested by Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2001), the role of specific village 
leader or other influential individual in the internal dynamic of community is 
acknowledged. In this situation, one may expect that social capital does not 
automatically increase the access to economic opportunities and resources such as 
formal credit.  Social capital does not guarantee the poor people to access formal 
credit (see. Bastelaer 2000).  
 
The second point of Tonkiss’ critic on the effect of social capital is the questions of 
capacity. She suggests that social networks cannot simply create physical or financial 
capital where this does not already exist.  Strong social ties become useless under 
domination of ‘mainstream’ economic and social networks. ‘Network poverty’ in this 
sense refers not to the absence or weakness of social network, but to the difficulty of 
accessing opportunities or resources through these networks. Therefore, to talk about 
‘social capital’, here, can become a way of not talking about poverty. Grootaert 
(1999) argues that investing in social capital is a sensible strategy for poor   2
households in Indonesia, however he also suggests that the poor have to work their 
way into social capital while the rich ‘buy’ their way.   
 
It is interesting to take a further investigation on the relation between  social capital 
and  a specific type of credit especially formal credit such as from commercial 
banking institution.  Previous studies show that low access to formal credit persist in 
Indonesia.  Van Diermen (1998) found that fewer respondents that have tried to 
access commercial (bank) credit and less who received loan although more than one-
half of respondents have the bank accounts. In the case of small industrialists in 
Yogyakarta, Brata (1999) found less than 10 percents of  small rural industrialists 
have access to credit from banking institutions although their bank accounts are 
sufficient for credit rating. 
 
The aim of this paper is to describe the connection between social capital and access 
to formal credit, especially from commercial banking in the case of a Javanese 
village. To describe the connection, this paper will seek what are the different 
characteristics between household that having access to commercial credit and the 
other group of households. However, since there is also an argument that social 
capital does not guarantee the poor to access formal credit, this paper also analyze 
other important variable namely ‘social position’ of the head of household in their 
rural community.   
 
A CASE OF A JAVANESE VILLAGE  
 
Dukuh Senden  in Prambanan, a sub-district in Sleman (DIY) was the location of 
field survey.  Survey was conducted in August 2004. Total respondents in this survey 
are 70 head of households. These samples are about 37 percents of total households 
in Dukuh Sanden.  
 
From 70 respondents only 22,9% (16) who has access to commercial loan from 
commercial banks. Most of them only got a credit from one credit source (75%). 
There are three respondents who received loan from two commercial banks. One of 
the respondents received formal credit from three loan sources (see TABLE 1). 
Therefore, total loan agreements of these 16 respondents are 21 agreements.  
 
TABLE 1. Having access to bank loan  
      Bank loan  n % 
0 bank        54   77.1 
1 bank        12   17.1 
2 banks          3     4.3 
3 banks          1      1.4   3
Average loan size is Rp 4,044 million while the range of loan size is from Rp 0,6 
million  up to Rp 10 million.  There are 12 respondents received loan Rp 2 million or 
more (see TABLE 2).  
  
TABLE 2.  Size of bank loans 
 Loan Size (Rp million)    n  % 
    0,6      2  12.5  
    1,0      1    6.25 
    1,5      1    6.25  
    2,0      4  25 
    4,0      2  12.5 
    5,0      3  18.75 
           10,0      3  18.75 
 Total       16  100.00 
 
Does social capital matter in accessing the  formal credit?   
 
This paper uses the density of membership of the respondents in local association as a 
simple indicator of social capital. Density of membership is one the dimensions of 
local association  (Grootaert, 1999).  Field survey found that more than 80 percents of 
head of households were member of local financial associations (such as arisan and 
simpan pinjam) and pengajian (a Moslem praying group).  On average, each head of 
household joined in five local associations. TABLE 3 shows a comparison between 
two groups based on the density of membership in local association.  
 
TABLE 3. Social capital: density of membership (mean) 
 Density of  Membership  Having access  to commercial credit? 
       Yes (=16) No (=54) 
  All associations    5.7  5.1 
Non-financial associations   4.1  3.7 
Financial associations    1.2  1.4 
 
TABLE 3 indicates that the density of membership of the “yes” group is larger than 
the “no” group, except in case of the financial associations. It is indicate the role of 
social capital in determine access of rural household to commercial credit. However, 
the table also shows that membership in non-financial associations was more valuable 
than in the financial associations in accessing the commercial banking loans. There 
are at least two reasons for this finding. First, most of local financial associations 
were related to informal credit. Second,  local financial associations were not actually 
designed  to access bank loans.  In short, local financial associations do not mediate 
the formal financial association primarily banking institution.  
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The survey also found 75.9% of  the respondents without access to bank loan have an 
interest to bank loan. There were 14 respondents have applied to bank loan however 
their proposals were rejected by the bank officers.  If we combine TABLE 1 and 
TABLE 4  then there were 30 respondents which have applied to bank loan but 
almost  half of the proposals were rejected. This finding confirms low access to 
formal credit still persists in rural areas.    
 
TABLE 4.  Having no access to bank loan 
        n    % (of 54) 
 Having interest to bank loan    41  75.9 
 Having deposit in bank    14  30.0  
Have applied to bank loan    14  30.0 
 
Does ‘ social position’  matter in accessing the  formal credit?   
 
The above findings raised a question about the role of social capital to increase access  
of rural household to bank loan. An interesting question in this context is about the 
relation of  accessing bank loan  and the social position of the head of household in 
the rural community. As found by Watterberg (2005), effects of different social ties 
vary by context and that an actor’s access to social ties and resources depends on her 
position in social space.   
 
In order to address the social position of the respondents in the local community, I 
used an indirect question. The respondents were asked to determine the backgrounds 
of their involvement in contending local problems in their village. These backgrounds 
were assumed represents their social position in their community. ‘Official duty’ 
represents formal elite position while ‘self-initiative’ and ‘asked by community’ 
perhaps more represents informal elite position.  Empirically rural elite could have 
both elite positions, therefore a respondent might give multiple answers. 
 
TABLE 5. Reasons in involvement in contending local problems (multiple answers) 
 Reasons in involvement  Having access  to commercial credit? 
       Yes (=16) No (=54) 
       n % n % 
 Official duty      4 25.0 9 16.7 
 Self initiative     15 93.8 45 83.3 
 Asked by community    12 75.0 22 40.7 
 
TABLE 5 indicates there are 13 formal elites in the village. Most of them were not 
have access to bank loan. However, there is an interesting picture if we compare both 
groups (‘having access’ and ‘having no access’).  Percentages of formal elites in the 
‘yes’ group are larger than in the ‘no’ group. The same picture also found in the   5
‘asked by community’ reason which more represents the informal elite position. In 
the rural areas, the village officials have a superior position since they are also  
simultaneously  as informal leaders.  Involvement in contending local problems of  
the formal elites also stimulated by their self-initiative and by the community.  
 
This finding confirms that rural elite, especially formal elites, have better position to 
access bank loan than ordinary community’s members. It is not surprisingly that the 
loan sizes of the village officials also were larger than the non-village officials. 
TABLE 6 shows a village official received bank loan Rp 5 million and three of them 
received loan Rp 10 million. This finding is supported by the income variable which 
indicates that the average income of the group with access to bank loan is larger than 
the other group. Average monthly income of the first group is Rp 1,087 million while 
the income of the second group only Rp 0,73 million.  
  
TABLE 6. Size of bank loan and reasons in involvement  
Loan size   Reasons   in   involvement  in    contending   local  problems 
(Rp million)  Official duty  Self-initiative     Asked by community 
   n         %  n      %     n  % 
   0,6  0      -  2  12.5      0                - 
   1,0  0      -  1    6.25      0                - 
   1,5  0      -  1    6.25      1               6.25  
   2,0  0      -  3  18.75       3             18.75 
   4,0  0      -  2  12.5      2             12.5   
   5,0  1     6.25  3  18.75       3             18.75   
 10,0  3   18.75  3  18.75       3             18.75 
Total   4   25.00  15  93.75     12         75.00    
 
The above discussion indicates that formal elites have superior position in accessing 
commercial loan. As local elite, they also have socially important role in local 
associations in their village. Therefore, their membership density in local association 
is larger than non-elite’s membership density (TABLE 7). This table also indicates 
that the non-financial associations are more important for formal elites than the 
financial associations which do not determine their access to bank loans.  
 
TABLE 7. Social capital of rural formal elites (mean) 
 Density of  Membership    Formal elites?  
       Yes (=13)  No (=57) 
  All associations    6.1   5.0 
Non-financial associations   4.4   3.6 
Financial associations    1.7   1.7 
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CONCLUSION  
 
Low access to formal credit still persists in Dukuh Senden.  Household who has  
higher social capital has better access to bank loan. Formal elites in the village have 
superior position to access bank loan. The findings perhaps also indicate that the 
formal elites in rural areas tend to have social capital higher than the non-elite. In 
other-word, level of social capital is actually linked to the social position of the rural 
household.  The rural elites have more accessibility to economic opportunities such as 
formal credit than non-elites do. 
 
The findings indicate there are equality and capacity problems in social capital in 
rural areas as argued by Tonkiss (2000).  Therefore, the paper suggests that the 
implementation of formal credit schemes in rural areas should consider not only the 
existing social capital but also the social structure of the rural society. This approach 
perhaps bring improvement on the implementation of formal credit program as an 




Brata, A. G. 1999. “Perilaku Tabungan Rumah Tangga: Kasus Industri Pedesaan di Bantul).” 
Analisis CSIS 28 (1), 1999: 75-86. 
Diermen, P. 1998.  Sistem  Kewirausahaan Industri Garmen dan Furnitur di Indonesia. 
Jakarta: PT Pustaka CIDESINDO-Massey University, New Zealand.  
Grootaert, C. 1999. “Social Capital, Household Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia.” Local 
Level Institution Study Working Paper No. 6.  Washington, D.C: The World Bank. 
Grootaert, C and T van Bastelaer. 2001. “Understanding and Measuring Social Capital: A 
Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations from the Social Capital Initiative.” 
Social Capital Initiative Working Paper No. 24. Washington, D.C: The World Bank. 
Narayan, D and L. Pritchett. 1997. “Cents and Sociability: Household Income and Social 
Capital in Rural Tanzania.“  Washington, D.C: The World Bank.   
Rhyne, E. and M. Otero. 1994. “Financial Services for Microenterprises: Principles and 
Institutions.”  In Maria Otero and Elisabeth Rhyne (eds.), The New World of Micro-
enterprise Finance. West Hartford: Kumarian Press, Inc.  
Tonkiss, F. 2000. “Trust, Social Capital and Economy.” In F. Tonkiss and A. Pasey (eds.). 
Trust and Civil Society. New York: St. Martin’s. pp. 72-89. 
Bastelaer, T. 2000. “Does Social Capital Facility the Poor’s Access to Credit? A Review on 
the Microeconomic Literature.”  Social Capital Initiative Working Paper No. 8. 
February 2000. 
Watterberg, A. 2005. “Crisis, Social Ties, and Household Welfare: Testing Social Capital 
Theory with Evidence from Indonesia.” World Bank. 
 
 
 
 
(IRSA-ALOYSIUS-05.DOC)  